What can be done to support meaningful and inclusive disarmament outcomes when the consensus principle remains fundamental to multilateral disarmament negotiations?
The norm of consensus decision-making in multilateral disarmament is well established, even though the rules for applying consensus have varied and evolved across forums, processes and types of decisions.
In practice, consensus is often treated as the default approach even where rules provide for voting. Consensus-based outcomes are therefore likely to remain a defining feature of multilateral disarmament negotiations, insofar as they are widely viewed as conferring legitimacy and universality. Despite innovations in how consensus has been interpreted and applied across disarmament and arms control processes, the principle can be expected to endure. The prevailing view that international security questions require consensus is likely to persist, given that such matters strike at the core of State security. At the same time, the tendency to treat consensus as de facto veto power has encouraged the pursuit of creative and adaptable alternatives rather than a strict, uniform application of the norm. In this regard, it is worth considering how the specific context of each process and subject area may warrant greater nuance in how consensus is understood and operationalized. What, then, can be done to support meaningful and inclusive disarmament outcomes when the consensus principle remains fundamental to multilateral disarmament negotiations?
• Treating consensus as a binary, zero-sum proposition has been a hindrance to substantive progress. It is therefore critical to create space for States to reflect on how consensus has evolved and been implemented over time across different issue areas, taking into account both its benefits and challenges. The elasticity of the norm can be a strength, and States should continue to support and explore its evolution through dedicated discussions of the disarmament machinery, as well as through forum-specific exchanges. In the current period of heightened strain on multilateralism, it is also important to recognize consensus as a practical instrument for bridging established approaches and emerging expectations.
• Given the particular importance that many States attach to consensus on matters of direct relevance to national security, States could consider whether consensus should apply equally to substantive and procedural decisions, insofar as these can be meaningfully distinguished. In some cases, applying consensus only to substantive outcomes may be an option worthy of attention. States might also consider differentiating between “tiers” of substance — for example, requiring consensus for outcomes that entail tangible national implementation, while allowing a lower threshold for political declarations or similar instruments. Such approaches are particularly relevant where procedural differences are used to block the commencement of substantive discussions altogether. Similarly, where dissociation is contemplated, it may be useful to distinguish between elements that are fundamental to the subject matter at hand and those more tangential in nature.
• While consensus outcomes may carry heightened legitimacy, outcomes with broad majority support should also be viewed positively and, in some cases, may be worth pursuing — particularly where the price of consensus is a “lowest common denominator” result. This dynamic is often reflected in majority adopted General Assembly resolutions that attract negative votes from only a small number of States. In assessing overall support for a proposal, the level and pattern of abstention should also be considered

Comments
Post a Comment