Multilateral disarmament has become more contested, complex and challenging.

Multilateral disarmament negotiations under United Nations auspices have traditionally sought consensual outcomes, regardless of the specific formal decision-making rules governing particular bodies. The preference for consensus is rooted in the legitimacy it is perceived to confer in matters of security — the fundamental concern of States. Because disarmament is directly linked to international security and, by extension, national security, many States have considered consensual decisionmaking essential to producing outcomes that are both credible and implementable. Reflecting this approach, consensus decision-making was seen as essential to negotiations and deliberations in two of the three main disarmament bodies recognized in 1978 by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament. The outcome document affirmed the central role of consensus — particularly in the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations — and the priority States attached to it. The United Nations General Assembly noted its awareness “of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus”. In addition to disarmament bodies explicitly mandated to operate by consensus, others have applied consensus decision-making as a matter of practice, reflecting the broader understanding of consensus as the norm in disarmament processes. These include groups of governmental experts, which often serve as a precursor to broader General Assembly engagement on emerging disarmament issues. Although such groups are formally expert bodies appointed to advise the Secretary-General, they have increasingly functioned in practice as intergovernmental negotiating forums, partly in response to long-standing stalemates across elements of the disarmament machinery. By established practice, groups of governmental experts operate based on consensus insofar as any substantive recommendations require agreement from all members. As a result, while these groups lack formal rules of procedure, their decisions on substance and advice to the United Nations Secretary-General effectively rest with participating States. In some cases, the objection of a single governmental expert prevented agreement on a substantive report. While consensus remains a fundamental guiding principle in disarmament negotiations, its application has faced increasing criticism in recent years. Some States argue that consensus has been privileged over substantive progress and that it can be instrumentalized as a de facto “veto power”, enabling one or a few actors to control outcomes — or prevent them altogether. Frustration over this dynamic has grown amid an increasingly difficult geopolitical context, in which multilateral disarmament has become more contested, complex and challenging. Against this backdrop, some have called for changes in working methods to ensure that consensus is not “abused” (see quote 1). This helps explain an emerging trend — particularly in the First Committee context — towards mandating negotiating processes under the General Assembly’s rules of procedure, which permit voting when consensus cannot be reached. Box 1 provides context on First Committee practice under those rules. In other instances, more flexible approaches to consensus have evolved. There have been cases in which a State, or a small group of States, has chosen not to break consensus but “dissociated”, “disassociated” or “distanced” itself from particular elements — or even from an agreement as a whole — indicating that it does not consider itself bound by any obligations or commitments arising from those elements (see boxes 2 and 3 for examples of this practice). While several disarmament bodies, including treaty follow-up and review mechanisms, still often adopt outcomes by consensus without accompanying explanations of position or dissociation, States have used such qualifications in other contexts to preserve consensus while signalling reservations. This emerging trend could be seen as encouraging an “à la carte” approach — enabling States to cherry-pick which elements of agreements they support.

In practice, it requires States to strike a delicate balance: pursuing substantive progress beyond the confines of consensus while still respecting the spirit and intent of the principle. This paper examines consensus as a critical normative foundation of multilateral disarmament by exploring how it has been applied in negotiation processes across two substantive workstreams: (a) nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and (b) conventional weapons. 

The paper first explores the meaning of “consensus” in the context of multilateral disarmament negotiations. It then reviews how the principle has been applied in intergovernmental processes relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to conventional weapons. It concludes with observations and recommendations for policymakers on how to support meaningful disarmament outcomes that balance inclusivity and practicality — so that consensus is treated as a foundational principle, not an immovable obstacle.