Enhancing knowledge on arms brokering in the context of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

Brokers can play an important role in facilitating or acting as intermediaries in the legitimate conventional arms trade. The phenomenon of individuals and companies facilitating and arranging arms deals between states and between states and arms producers – for example, bringing sellers and buyers together – is not new. However, since the 1990s, and particularly in conflicts in Angola and West Africa, high-profile cases and popular culture have raised greater awareness of arms brokering. This applies in particular to the way in which some unscrupulous brokers are actively engaged in the diversion and illicit trade in conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), and ammunition to or between unauthorized (end-) users – including criminals, pirates, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and groups listed as terrorist groups and their procurement networks. The fact that such entities were not explicitly controlled or regulated by modern transfer control systems appeared to be a blind spot that needed to be addressed to prevent the diversion of arms. The lack of regulation of arms brokering and brokers in many United Nations Member States means that even brokers that facilitate global transactions for the legitimate, licit arms trade may unwittingly be involved in, or facilitate rather than prevent, diversion of arms to the illicit market. Thus, when considering how to prevent and mitigate the risk of international arms transfers being diverted – and therefore posing a threat to peace, security and stability – the United Nations Security Council and multilateral arms control processes have examined the issue of brokering more closely since the 1990s.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is not the first multilateral conventional arms control instrument to require states to take measures to regulate arms brokering and prevent or reduce the risk of brokers diverting conventional arms to the illicit arms trade. Over the past three decades, United Nations Member States have adopted three global instruments that include provisions to address illicit arms brokering:

• The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA)
• The United Nations Firearms Protocol
• The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

In addition, on numerous occasions the Security Council has expressed concern about and recalled the connection between illicit arms brokering and other illicit activities as a major factor fuelling and exacerbating conflicts. In resolutions on SALW, arms embargoes, non-proliferation, and eliminating the supply to and acquisition of weapons by terrorists, the Council has repeatedly called on states to implement their existing commitments. Thus, United Nations Member States have made multiple commitments to implement measures to regulate arms brokers and brokering activities and to take action to address illicit brokers and prevent illicit brokering in conventional arms. Moreover, the 116 ATT states parties are obliged under Article 10 of the Treaty to regulate brokering and under Article 11 to counter the diversion of conventional arms, including by illicit brokering.

During the final rounds of ATT negotiations in 2012 and 2013, a large majority of states from different regions noted that, without brokering controls, the Treaty would not be able to meet its stated objectives and purposes. A UNIDIR research report that informed the original negotiations found that definitions and other key issues had to be carefully considered when engaging in a dialogue on brokering in the context of the ATT. Yet, since the ATT’s entry into force, there has been no dedicated dialogue on the effective implementation of its brokering and related provisions during the annual Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) and working group meetings. Furthermore, previous research and other available information indicate that implementation by states parties is uneven: some seem concerned, others face implementation challenges. In addition, some of the signatory states have concerns with regards to implementing the Treaty’s brokering provisions. This is compounded by the fact that, ever since the original negotiations of the Treaty and its entry into force, a number of unresolved questions, knowledge gaps and key issues have remained.

1.1. PURPOSE OF THIS ATT ISSUE BRIEF

This ATT Issue Brief is intended to address some of these gaps and to provide reference material to inform a meaningful dialogue between states and other interested stakeholders within the ATT framework on the effective implementation of the Treaty’s brokering provisions. Further, it identifies some of the unresolved questions and key issues that merit further consideration by states and other interested stakeholders. Specifically, with the reconfigured structure of the ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) and its work plan, there will be an examination of the implementation of ATT Article 10 (on brokering) in the near future. This Issue Brief is intended to provide a basis for fruitful discussions on the complex issue of regulating arms brokering.

This is the fifth ATT Issue Brief prepared by the research consortium that includes Conflict Armament Research, the Stimson Center and UNIDIR. It is part of a series of issue briefs that seeks to enhance knowledge, provide tools and facilitate dialogue among states. They aim to strengthen shared understanding on the impact of the ATT in addressing diversion, as well as to identify effective measures and avenues to further promote effective policies and practices under the Treaty. This ATT Issue Brief builds on existing research conducted by the consortium, relevant documents developed by ATT States Parties to support effective Treaty implementation, instruments and guidance documents developed by states at the regional level, and relevant publications by international and regional organizations. It also includes an analysis of relevant information contained in publicly available initial ATT implementation reports from 70 states parties. As part of this research, the reports submitted by United Nations Member States under the PoA in 2024 were also analysed.

The Issue Brief is structured as follows:

The rest of Section 1 introduces the topic and provides an overview of definitions. As well as describing what arms brokers and brokering activities are, it includes different regional and global common understandings of core brokering activities.

Section 2 presents case studies to illustrate how illicit brokering facilitates the diversion of conventional arms and related items.

Section 3 introduces the ATT provisions on regulating brokering and addressing the role played by illicit brokering in facilitating diversion. It also provides an overview of implementation of Article 10 based on an analysis of publicly available initial reports submitted by ATT states parties as of July 2024, as well as other relevant information contained in reports on the implementation of the PoA.
In conclusion, 

Section 4 outlines potential options for ATT states parties and other stakeholders to enhance shared understanding on the issue of brokering and on strengthening brokering regulation.

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